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In 1984, the United States Supreme Court adopted a "good-faith" excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment. 2 Criticism of the new
rule immediately followed.' While the merits of the good-faith exception had
been debated and the rule's adoption anticipated for years before the Supreme
Court accepted it,4 the new exception added to an already confusingly complex
1. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).
2. The Court adopted the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984). Under Leon, the exclusionary rule will not affect evidence which is
obtained by police officers who act in objectively reasonable reliance on a search war-
rant that is valid on its face but later held invalid. Id. at 913. The central rationale of
the good-faith exception is that an officer acting in good faith is not acting illegally,
and therefore the main purpose of the exclusionary rule - deterrence - is lost. Id. at
918-19.
3. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Leon and in Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), a companion case to Leon. Justice Stevens dissented in
Leon but concurred in Sheppard. Scholarly criticism has been widespread. See, e.g.,
Alschuler, Close Enough for Government Work: The Exclusionary Rule After Leon,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 315-16 (Leon doctrine may not alter the "bottom line" of the
review of warrants from pre-Leon days; the Court only "shifted the review of search
and arrest warrants"); LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency: United States v.
Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 901-02 (Leon sus-
pect in several ways; Leon erroneously based on the assertion that exclusionary rule is
not a constitutional right but only a judge-made remedy for fourth amendment viola-
tions); Note, Constitutional Criminal Procedure - The Good Faith Exception in Action
- Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1100, 1111 (1985) (criticizing Sheppard
for extending "an exception created for evidence gained through a magistrate's mistake
concerning probable cause to evidence gained via technically deficient warrants").
4. For a sampling of the pre-Leon debate, see Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth
Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World:
On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 (1982);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736
(1972).
Justice White, who wrote for the majority in Leon, advocated adoption of a good-
faith exception in his dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537-39 (1976) (White,
1
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area of criminal procedure.
In United States v. Leon,5 the Court approved the good-faith exception.
In so doing, it spelled out the several considerations behind the adoption of the
exception. First, the decision whether to apply the exclusionary rule is a
weighing process, the result of which will differ with each case.6 The purpose
of the exclusionary rule, the Court said, is to discourage misconduct of the
police. This deterrence ideal does not have effect when an officer acts reasona-
bly.7 In essence the Court said that good-faith actions of police, even though
those actions are errant, cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule.
In Maryland v. Garrison8 the Court seized another opportunity to deal
with a facet of good faith and the fourth amendment. The Court in Garrison
faced a factual situation that seemed simple on its face but in the end led to
fourth amendment problems not easily resolved. Police in Baltimore obtained a
warrant to search Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park
Avenue third floor apartment."' The officers had made a "reasonable investi-
gation"'10 of the premises to be searched; they had checked with a police in-
formant concerning the layout of the third floor, they performed an examina-
tion from the exterior of the premises to be searched, and they checked with a
local utility company, all of which led to the conclusion that only one apart-
ment existed on the third floor.1"
McWebb was outside the building when the police arrived to conduct the
search, and the police used his key to get in the third-floor door.12 The police
entered Harold Garrison's apartment on the third floor, searched it and found
heroin, drug paraphernalia and cash.' 3 It was not until the search had turned
up the illegal materials that the officers realized that the third floor housed
two apartments, and as soon as that realization was made the search was
ended.1
The judge at Garrison's trial for possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute denied Garrison's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search. The Maryland Special Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland
Court of Appeals reversed.' 5 The United States Supreme Court was faced
with two issues: the validity of the search warrant in view of its overbreadth
J., dissenting) and in a concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246
(1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
5. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6. Id. at 906-08.
7. Id. at 918-21.
8. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).
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and the method of the warrant's execution.16 The Court judged the validity of
the warrant from the point of view of the officers at the time they acted to
obtain it because "items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued
have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. 117 The Court
concluded with some ease that the warrant was valid because the officers dis-
closed all information they had about the nature of the premises, despite the
fact that "it authorized a search that turned out to be ambiguous in scope."18
The Court considered the issue of the reasonableness of the mistake on
the issue of the warrant's execution. The majority's test for warrant execution
reasoned that "the validity of the search of respondent's apartment pursuant
to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on
whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was ob-
jectively understandable and reasonable."1 9
One of the central controversies between the majority and three dissent-
ing Justices involved support for the majority's reliance on the reasonableness
of the mistake to conclude that no fourth amendment violation occurred.2 0 In
a footnote that appeared important both to the majority's and dissent's analy-
ses, the dissent pointed out a rationale that had been used in lower federal
courts and in state courts to resolve just the type of situation faced by the
Garrison Court with respect to the warrant's validity:
Lower court cases, that deal with an exception to the particularity-of-descrip-
tion requirement in a warrant, may support this standard of a 'reasonable
mistake.' Some courts have recognized an exception that applies where, to
outward appearances, a building appears to be a single-occupancy structure
but contains, in reality, several units, and where the officers executing the
warrant could not have discovered its multiple-occupancy character despite
reasonable efforts. 2"
The majority had done everything but expressly recognize that rationale and
incorporate it into law.
Although the dissent disputed its importance and its applicability, the ra-
tionale set forth in the footnote seems to fit neatly with the majority's holding
16. Id. at 1017.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1018.
19. Id. at 1019. The Court's discussion of mistake by the police centered around
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). In Hill, police had probable cause to arrest
Hill and went to his apartment to make a warrantless arrest. Miller, who matched
Hill's description, answered the door of Hill's apartment. Id. at 799. The police be-
lieved in good faith that Miller was in fact Hill, the Court said, and therefore Miller's
arrest was valid. Id. at 802. The Court in Garrison said that Hill's "underlying ration-
ale that an officer's reasonable misidentification of a person does not invalidate a valid
arrest is equally applicable to an officer's reasonable failure to appreciate that a valid
warrant describes too broadly the premises to be searched." 107 S. Ct. at 1019.
20. Id. at 1022.
21. Id. at 1023 n.4.
19881
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in declaring the warrant valid. It is this new application of the good-faith doc-
trine that seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Court.2
This Note will present an outline of the Garrison approach to the good-
faith doctrine as it has been debated, created and applied in lower federal
courts and in state courts, show how and why this rule fits the Court's thinking
and approach in Garrison, distinguish the new application from the good-faith
exception announced in United States v. Leon, and compare the extension of
the doctrine to the rule in Leon in anticipation of their coexistence.
The Garrison Approach to Good Faith
The fourth amendment, of course, requires that search warrants contain a
specific description of the place, person or thing to be searched or seized. 28
Unique problems arise when dealing with warrants to search buildings with
several separate apartments, hotels or other multiple-occupancy dwellings be-
cause police must first determine which unit will be the target of the search. In
view of the particularity-of-description requirement the sound rule has devel-
oped that a warrant that does not specify a particular unit to be searched will
be held invalid because of overbreadth. 24 One commentator astutely noted that
"the probable cause requirement would be substantially diluted if a search of
several living units could be authorized upon a showing that some one of the
units within the description, not further identifiable, probably contained the
items sought."2 5 An example of an inadequate description would be a descrip-
tion using only a street number of a multi-unit structure.26
22. For a good discussion of the doctrine's existence in lower courts, see 2 W.
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(b) (1978).
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The exact language reads: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized" (emphasis added). See United States
v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955) for a general discussion of the particularity-of-
description requirement as it applies to multiple-occupancy buildings.
24. United States v. Busk, 693 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Higgins,
428 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1970); Tynan v. United States, 297 F. 177 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 604 (1924); United States v. Parmenter, 531 F. Supp. 975 (D. Mass.
1982); United States v. Esters, 336 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v.
Barkouskas, 38 F.2d 837 (M.D. Pa. 1930); People v. Grossman, 19 Cal. App. 3d 8, 96
Cal. Rptr. 437 (1971); Fance v. State, 207 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State
v. Gordon, 221 Kan. 253, 559 P.2d 312 (1977); State v. Manzella, 392 So. 2d 403 (La.
1980); State v. Stevenson, 589 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
25. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22, at § 4.5(b).
26. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955); People v. Alarid, 174
Colo. 289, 483 P.2d 1331 (1971); Jones v. State, 126 Ga. App. 841, 192 S.E.2d 171
(1972); Commonwealth v. Erickson, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 440 N.E.2d 1190 (1982);
State v. Ratushny, 82 N.J. Super. 499, 198 A.2d 131 (1964); People v. Rainey, 14
N.Y.2d 35, 197 N.E.2d 527, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964). For examples of sufficiently
particular descriptions in a warrant, see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 4.5(b), at 79.
4
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The new application of the good-faith doctrine to the particularity-of-
description requirement which seems to have been adopted in Garrison hinges
on objectively reasonable behavior on the part of the police.27 It should be
noted that the Court never explicitly adopted this line of cases and school of
thought. The same approach has been created and has evolved primarily in
various federal appellate courts and in some state appellate courts.
A leading case is United States v. Santore.28 In Santore a defendant
named Orlando was convicted of selling narcotics.2" The warrant to search
Orlando's apartment identified the premises as "164 Hill Street, Elmont, Long
Island, New York, being a one family house, in the Eastern District of New
York."30 As it turned out, however, the building housed two families. Al-
though the house was registered with local housing authorities as a one-family
dwelling, Orlando had divided the house without gaining permission to do so. 31
Orlando argued that the warrant was void for not meeting the particularity-of-
description requirement.3 2 The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that the
warrant had the necessary "practical accuracy" 33 and that since the police had
no indication of the change in the inside of the house the description was
sufficient. 34
The Garrison dissent's important fourth footnote 35 mentioned United
States v. Davis,38 in which officers obtained a warrant to search the house of
defendant Davis. When the warrant was obtained the officers thought the
house was a single-family dwelling. 7 During the search, however, the officers
found that there were two apartments in the house, and when that fact was
discovered the search was confined to those areas of the house "under Davis's
use and control."' 38 The warrant was upheld based on the reasoning of
Santore.39
27. LaFave states that:
[I]f the building in question from its outward appearance would be taken
to be a single-occupancy structure and neither the affiant nor other investigat-
ing officers nor the executing officers knew or had reason to know of the struc-
ture's actual multiple-occupancy character until execution of the warrant was
under way, then the warrant is not defective for failure to specify a subunit
within the named building.
2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 4.5(b), at 79.
28. 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1960).
29. Id. at 66.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 66-67.
32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id.
35. 107 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. 557 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).
37. Id. at 1248.
38. Id.
39. Id. Accord Owens v. Scafati, 273 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 969 (1967); People v. McGill, 187 Colo. 65, 528 P.2d 386 (1974); Jackson v.
1988]
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Without referring to any of the cases which outline the doctrine, the Gar-
rison majority applied the above reasoning to resolve the issue of the warrant's
validity and to satisfy the particularity requirement.4 0 The lack of a specific
reference to the Santore-Davis rationale makes it unclear that the Court had
those cases in mind, but as the discussion that follows will show, albeit with
minor incongruities which are not difficult to explain, the Court embraced the
principle.
The officers in Garrison were reasonably mistaken as to the existence of
two apartments on the third floor of the building that was to be searched, and,
based on the lack of information available to the officers when the warrant was
issued, the Court held the warrant valid.,1 An exception to a part of the war-
rant requirement - that the warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched - was thus recognized when dealing with multiple-unit structures.
The dissent argued that this exception should not apply in Garrison because
the police knew that the building contained several units, but they did not
know how many apartments were on the third floor.4 2 The police in Garrison
knew, however, that the suspect lived on the third floor and for that reason
were unconcerned with the other portions of the house. Therefore, the third
floor in essence was treated as a separate dwelling. Because the police reasona-
bly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor, there ap-
peared to be no danger of offending the rights of non-suspects.43
Careful scrutiny of the Garrison application reveals its soundness. 4 Pro-
fessor LaFave, who has criticized the Leon exception,45 offers two reasons in
support of the rule.46 First, the rule recognizes that reasonable investigations,
not perfect ones, are what we demand of the police. In Garrison the police
State, 129 Ga. App. 901, 201 S.E.2d 816 (1973).
40. 107 S. Ct. at 1017-18.
41. Id.
42. 107 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun rea-
soned that officers should be held to a higher standard when they know that a building
contains several apartments. Since they already know that there are several apart-
ments, the argument goes, the police are aware that there is a greater risk of infringing
on the fourth amendment rights of non-suspects. Id.
43. The majority's discussion in its footnote 13 goes a long way toward distin-
guishing Garrison from the types of cases that would seem to distress the dissenters.
107 S. Ct. at 1019 n.13. The footnote reads:
We expressly distinguish the facts of this case from a situation in which the
police know there are two apartments on a certain floor of a building, and
have probable cause to believe that drugs are being sold out of that floor, but
do not know in which of the two apartments the illegal transactions are taking
place. A search pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of the entire floor
under those circumstances would present quite different issues from the ones
before us in this case.
Id.
44. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22.
45. LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency: United States v. Leon, Its Ra-
tionale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895.
46. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22.
[Vol. 53
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used three sources - an informant, their own examination of the building and
a utility-company check - to ascertain the number of third-floor apart-
ments.47 The Court held that reliance on such sources was reasonable. Second,
when this type of mistake occurs it is not discovered until the search has be-
gun.48 Such was the case in Garrison, and when the police realized that a
mistake had been made the search of Garrison's apartment ended.49 This in
itself tends to show good faith by the police. Additionally, LaFave contends
that the rule is sound as long as it is given a narrow construction. 0
Misapplication of the Garrison rationale to protect police when legitimate
fourth amendment violations occur seems to be avoidable in that the rule is
distinguishable on at least two grounds. The doctrine will apply only in a few
situations as long as it is given the recommended narrow construction. 1 More-
over, the rule rarely will need to be invoked, given the factual distinctiveness
of cases like Garrison.
The rule also serves as an example of the application of reality to criminal
procedure in recognition of the imperfection involved in criminal investiga-
tions. The central rationale for this portion of the Garrison rule is essentially
identical to the rationale of United States v. Leon: deterrence will not be effec-
tive when police make unintentional mistakes while acting reasonably.52
Comparing and Contrasting Garrison and Leon
Some critics voice the concern that Garrison represents an unreasonable
extension of the Leon good-faith exception.13 That criticism is inaccurate in
that Garrison's application and approach to good faith are distinguishable
from Leon's, although the two rules are similar and share rationales. The Gar-
47. 107 S. Ct. at 1015.
48. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22. Although in Garrison the mistake in describ-
ing the premises to be searched was not discovered until the search began, it is not
clear that this will always be the case as LaFave implies. Perhaps LaFave's point is
better expressed in his statement that in most of these cases, "the discovery of the
multiple occupancy occurred only after the police had proceeded so far that withdrawal
would jeopardize the search." Id. at 80.
49. 107 S. Ct. at 1015.
50. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 22. LaFave says that the rule should be applied
only when three factors exist. First, the officers did not know and could not have rea-
sonably known that more than one apartment existed. Second, the error is not discov-
ered until the search is under way. Third, when the multiple-unit character is discov-
ered the police make "reasonable efforts" to decide which apartment is the target. Id.
In Garrison the first factor was satisfied by the pre-search investigation. The error was
not discovered until the search had begun, thereby satisfying the second factor. Finally,
when the police discovered that two apartments existed on the third floor they chose to
discontinue the search of the wrong apartment, and thus the third factor was met.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
53. Bernstein, Supreme Court Review, TRIAL, June 1987, at 90.
1988]
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rison rule deals specifically with an element of the warrant requirement;"4 in
Leon, the Court explicitly left "untouched the probable-cause standard and
the various requirements for a valid warrant."5 The Leon exception prevents
the use of the exclusionary rule to bar evidence in the prosecution's case-in-
chief when the evidence is obtained by officers acting in good-faith reliance on
a warrant that later is found invalid.56 The warrant in Garrison was held to be
valid.5 7 Therefore, although the doctrines are similar, it is clear that they deal
with separate areas of fourth amendment law.
The discussion of good faith and the particularity-of-description require-
ment in Garrison solves the problem of whether a valid warrant was issued.
For resolution of the issue of the method of execution of the warrant, the
Court used a reasonableness analysis,58 relying solely on Hill v. California9
for the proposition that the legality of searching Garrison's apartment hinges
on whether it was reasonable for the officers not to realize that the warrant
involved was too broad.60
Discussion of the Leon exception in connection with the issue of warrant
execution and a comparison of the Leon and Garrison rules in that light may
prove useful."1 It appears that a not-far-removed corollary of the Leon good-
faith exception could have been (and perhaps was) applied in Garrison. The
Leon rule - "that evidence seized, albeit pursuant to an invalid warrant, may
be admitted in evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief, if the law enforce-
ment officer secured the warrant in good faith ' 62 - is based on the assump-
tion that the search warrant was executed properly and that police "searched
only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were
covered by the warrant."6 3 Similarly, in Garrison the police searched only
where they thought they legally could do SO. 614 Therefore, the concept of rea-
54. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
55. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 920-21.
57. 107 S. Ct at 1018. For a discussion of the good-faith issue as it applies to the
warrant execution issue, see infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
58. 107 S. Ct. at 1018-20.
59. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In its discussion of warrant execu-
tion, the Court reiterated its intent to give police "some latitude" in which mistakes
may be tolerated. 107 S. Ct. at 1018. In addition, the Court said the officers acted
properly in the circumstances "even if the warrant is interpreted as authorizing a
search limited to McWebb's apartment rather than the entire third floor." Id. at 1019.
61. Despite an admonition against confusing Leon with the issue of warrant exe-
cution, see Note, The Good Faith Exception: Should It Allow Courts to Avoid Expli-
cation of Underlying Fourth Amendment Issues?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 799, 800 n,8
(1986), the discussion here about the effect of the Leon and Garrison approaches on
warrant execution will explore the logical relationship between the two approaches.
62. Id. at 800 (1986).
63. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 n.19 (1984).
64. 107 S. Ct. at 1019. The police "perceived McWebb's apartment and the
third-floor premises as one and the same; therefore their execution of the warrant rea-
[Vol. 53
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sonableness was central in both cases.
The difference comes in consideration of the crucial distinguishing factor
between the cases: Leon involved an invalid warrant, but the warrant in Garri-
son was expressly held to be valid. If we will allow admission of evidence ob-
tained pursuant to an invalid warrant when the police obtain the warrant with
good faith, we should allow admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a valid
warrant when both procurement of the warrant and the execution thereof were
done with good faith. Viewed in these terms, the Garrison rule is merely a
logical extension of Leon. The two rules are not contradictory but complemen-
tary, and because of this compatibility their coexistence should be harmonious.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Garrison added an-
other good-faith consideration to a part of fourth amendment analysis. 5 The
Court approved an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement's
particularity-of-description requirement as it applies to searches of multiple-
occupancy buildings. 6 The approach used by the Court seems to have its roots
and rationale in the other, expressly recognized good-faith exception of United
States v. Leon.17 Both rules are grounded in the notion that police will not be
deterred by the exclusionary rule from committing fourth amendment viola-
tions when they mistakenly or in good faith commit the violation."
Although the Garrison rule shares characteristics with the Leon good-
faith exception, the two deal with quite different situations and areas of the
law of search and seizure.6 9 The similarities make the rules complementary.
Most important, the Garrison case involves common sense in recognition of
the fact that we cannot demand perfection of our law enforcement officers but
merely reasonable, good-faith efforts.
THOMAS M. HARRISON
sonably included the entire third floor." Id. In Leon's terms, the police in Garrison
searched only the places that they reasonably thought were included in the warrant.
65. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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